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Guillermo Hansen
The globalizing and unsettling forces of capitalism, technology, climate
change, m ass media and popular culture chart a reality m arked by fleet
ness, disorientation and rapid social change. Empire is the name that
we give to the global network of hierarchies and divisions th at prom ise
and attem pt to m aintain order through new m echanism s of control and
conflict—a specific regime of global relations.1Empire refers neither to
a single country, nor to a unified political system, but to a global net
work of sovereignty that rests on dom inant nation-states, supranational
institutions and m ajor capitalist corporations.
Yet, in spite of empire’s attem pt to order and control planetary life,
millions of people are reacting and resisting in different ways. Most are
pursuing personal solutions to systemic problems, thus confirming that
‘biopower,” (regulating social life through control over individuals’ bodies
and thinking), is the essence of imperial domination. Others, small num
bers affiliated with religious, leftist and ecological organizations, attem pt
to resist empire by postulating an outside utopic realm of moral purity,
from which an epic redemption will flow.- Finally, far greater and growing
numbers identify themselves with religious fundamentalist views that are
usually functional to or absorbed by empire or, in some cases, embody
anti-systemic resistance—by peaceful and/or violent means.
The phenomenon of fundamentalism is particularly significant because
here we witness a multilayered crisis. If today, under empire, the global
economy is tending toward the production of social life itself, in which the
economic, political and cultural increasingly overlap, then it can be argued
that fundamentalism is one of the main symptoms of empire’s dysfunctional

11follow Michael Ila rd t’s and Antonio Negri's concept of Empire, as developed ill Michael Ilardt
and Anlonio Negri, E m pire (Cambridge: H arvard University Press, 2000), pp. xi-xii,
“ See ibid., p. 46.

character. It is more than a religious superstition;'* it is a rallying point for
all those who feel distressed by the peculiar way in which empire seeks
to regulate the mesh of economic, political and cultural life. This is often
referred to as the “m aterialist” and “secular” (lis-values ol'lale modernity.
Certainly not all forms of fundamentalism react equally to all t hese dimen
sions, but since they are religious movements, the cultural aspects deserve
careful attention—especially how religious symbols seek today to in (luence
the political and institutional configurations of the emerging world.
This article focuses on dem ocracy as a genuine alternative to the
logic of empire and the different forms of fundamentalism . Although
fundam entalism s are avowedly not keen on democracy, it is also true
th at th e economic and political forces of empire are steadily driving
existing (liberal) dem ocracies into “stales of exception.” This poses
a peculiar m enace to dem ocratic principles. Democracy as a political
system and culture, resting on values such as freedom, equality, social
justice and the rule of civil law, is likely to be the real casualty of the
struggle betw een fundam entalism s and globalization.
Yet, there may also be new opportunities for democracy, emerging from
inside empire, that is, from the underside of the hierarchies of domination,
through the creation of new global circuits of cooperation and collabora
tion. Here new kinds of relationships and power are locally and globally
linking people, who have a common desire to exercise democracy as an
affirmation of life in its multiple expressions, across religious, ethnic,
cult ural, gender and class divides. In this form of active resistance, a
fourth strategy in the face of empire, tolerance, becomes a key instrum ent
in the search for democratic solutions to systemic problems.
While as moral beings we are always faced with ethical choices, today
there is increased urgency to reach wide consensus over the values and
metaphors that will determine our lives. Freedom and equality have been
focal desiderata of modernity, yet the historicist and progressive myths,
through which these values have been nurtured, are on the wane. Since
values are always embedded in mythical narratives, we need to understand
the ways of knowledge and cultural mutations linked with sociopolitical
and systemic changes. Today, as societies and consciousness become more
pluralistic, tolerance is not. only a desirable moral virtue but a necessary
systemic quality. Combined with freedom and equality, tolerance makes
participatory democracy the best, arrangement for shaping our collective
From su p e r si a re, to stand over som ething that is a vestige from the past.
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and global fate. In this regard, religions are again poised to play a critical
role—eit her for or against, tolerance, democracy and peace.
I low then does our Lutheran heritage and its core theological metaphors
contribute to what confronts us in public life, with its new netw orks of
power? Can this meaningfully orient us for dealing with these m atters?
In sum, can Lutheran theology be a beacon for democracy, tolerance and
pluralism against fundamentalism s? I suggest th at Lutheranism may be
able to contribute significantly, if it s theological m etaphors for salvation
also cut across the “order of creation.” In this sense, justification by faith
and the cross, understood in term s of God’s threefold-multidimensional
action (two kingdoms), may evoke a theological space for relating to val
ues such as difference, plurality, tolerance and acknowledging the other
within a dem ocratic institut ional framework. This can ground a robust
Lutheran public theology which inspires strategies to face the subtle
power of empire and the enchanting choruses of fundamentalism .
I propose three insights that, structure Lutheranism’s intersection with
the present challenge's: justificat ion by faith and (he upholding of inclu
siveness; God’s threefold-multidimensional action (i.e., two kingdoms) of
creating and sustaining democratic arrangements; and thee cross as the
critical “weapon” (and a critique of weapons) against the “glory” of empire,
totalitarianism , fundamentalism and war. The challenge is to articulate
these dimensions without falling into moralizing or legalistic solutions
to deep structural, cultural and social disputes. This implies placing our
theology within the present cultural and religious debate and consistent
with t he methodology of the cross: a theology done from the bowels of
empire, revealing its true face behind it s allegedly “benevolent ” mask.

From republic to empire
S y m p to m s o f tra n sitio n

It is tem pting to fall into the vice of binary thought when approaching
the relationship betw een fundam entalism , tolerance and democracy.
Media, news, reports and discourses can lead to the conclusion that
today dem ocracy—broadly defined1—is at peril prim arily because of
1Democracy understood as a set o fin stitu tio n al and legal principles and practices such as: the
ruU' of law and equal access in ju stice; division of powers; guarantees ofluim an and civil rights
that are upheld and independently m onitored; free and fair elections involving a genuine eompe-
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the “extern al” and “evil” forces of religious fundam entalism (especially
Islamic). Samuel H untington’s highly influential theory of the clash
of civilizations, for example, has given academ ic veneer to a political
paradigm th at compartmentalizes inner dimensions of the contemporary
world-system into antagonist camps. This creates a false impression and
consciousness. The real danger for “dem ocracy” may lie not only with
those who express grievances against the hypocrisy of “dem ocratic”
countries, but also with those who in the name of democratic values sup
p ort intolerant and vigilante practices. Inherent to the different forms of
fundam entalism is establishing regimes of intolerance, which challenge
the system and culture of democracy. “Democracies” around the world
are increasingly sliding tow ard a “state of exception,” where freedom
is curtailed in the name of freedom, as Latin American dictatorships
once curtailed democracy in the nam e of democracy.5
It is essential to have a systemic view of the present globalized world
system to situate the dynamics linking fundamentalism with the con
tem porary neoconservative “states of exception.” Fundam entalism s are
symptoms marking the passage to a new state of affairs.'1They embody
a refusal of some or all aspects of modernity, democracy and secularly,
which are conceived, rightly or wrongly, as weapons of “liberal,” foreign
or Western hegemony.7 They are late- or postm odern in a double sense:
in th at chronologically they follow and oppose modernity, while cultur-

tition of ideas, perm itting consensual, non-violent changes of governm ent; freedom of speech,
p ress and m edia; healthy, autonom ous civil society institutions ami netw orks, independent of
the state; accountability of authority and transparency of decisions; entrenched property and
econom ic rights; social ju stice and basic security; an ethos of dialogue, questioning, trust, and
moral aw areness; w idespread, free access to the inform ation needed to discuss, scrutinize,
make choices about and uphold all these com ponents of a dem ocratic society. Behind these
principles lay certain core values such as the political equality of all citizens; open deliberation
before decision making so that all can voice their interests and concerns; a high degree of citizen
participation in the processes of democracy, that respects and encourages the different views
of others; a pluralism of ins! it utions and the independence of critical voices that maint ain the
long-term health and openness of dem ocratic societies.
InSlnto di ccceziour, the Italian philosopher Giorgio Againben shows how Western dem ocracies
becom e invested with the need of turning emergency into the foundation of their existence. The
m ilitary and the econom ic “sta te of em ergency” often merge into one, employing w ar m etaphors
as m ain currency in public speeches. He sla te s that “The principle according to which necessity
defines a sin g u lar situation in which th e law loses its ois obligatidi. [...) is inverted into th a t a c 
cording to which necessity constitutes, so to speak, the ultim ate foundation and the very source
of the law." Giorgio Agamben, Stnto di eccczione (Torino: Hollati Boringhicri, 2003), p. 37.
11 See Hard! and Negri, op. <•}(., (note 1), pp. 1371T.
7 See ibid., p. 119.
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ally they ride on the waves generated by the falling walls of modern (and
Western) philosophical theories which placed religion in an interdict."
Late-modern fundamentalism requires us to look at the long-term
economic, political, cultural and epistemological dynamics character
izing empire. Thereby we can understand why democracy and tolerance
have such urgency today. Inspired by chaos theory, the social scientist.,
Immanuel Wallerstein," m aintains that an existing system that can no lon
ger function adequately within its defined param eters faces a bifurcat ion
where a “choice" is pressed upon it. Neither of the present antagonistic
camps will prevail; the system as a whole will change. In effect, every
system can be said to be “alive.” The “liveliness” is seen in its processes.
If a system survives, it pursues its historical life within the framework
and constraints of its constitutive structures. It obeys a cyclical dynamic,
as well as secular, linear trend (s). When the expansion of secular trends
jeopardizes the equilibrium enacted by the cyclical process, the crisis
cannot be solved within the system as such; a bifurcation is imminent.
Thus today, institutions and social arrangem ents face a new set of
possibilities: either a radicalization of dem ocratic principles and p ra c
tices, or falling into new hierarchical and intolerant forms of tutelage.
The outcome will depend on the many decisions or actions taken in
tim es of rapid change. History does not have a moral vector; it does not
necessarily lead to greater tolerance, liberty or equality.
We therefore find ourselves in a crucible of uncertainties. This pe
riod is of extraordinary im portance because the intellectual, moral and
political decisions made will have exponential effects. For this reason
fundam entalism cannot be dism issed as a rom antic reversal of history,
destined to fail because history always “progresses.” Actually, it is one
of the possible outcom es oflate modernity. In times where interdictions
against religion are falling, the religious dimension may be destined to
play a critical role in either dem ocracy’s demise or its flourishing."’ Do
Lutheranism ’s core m etaphors have any role to play in this new cultural,

s This notion is developed by yet another Italian philosopher, Gianni Valtimo, in “La huella de la
liuella,” Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo (ods), La ivUyiou (M adrid: PPG, 1990), pp. 1111'
9 Immanuel W allerstein, World-System Analy sis: An Introd uction (Durham : Duke University
Press, 2004); Immanuel W allerstein, The Uncertaintie s o f Knowtedye (Philadelphia: Temple
University P ress, 2001).
1(1It is ironic that modern democracy, whose roots can partially be traced to n reaction against reli
gious intolerance (Locke et at.), may today require the mystique and conviction given by religion.
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political and social scenario, that is, in construct ing an alternative, more
hum ane global network?
The “longue d u re e ”:" Tolerance, in toleran ce a n d violence

A system ic analysis of empire posits neither nation-states, political re
gimes, religious bodies, nor geo-cultural zones, but rather the dynamic
network, cutting across and undergirding all of the above and providing
a structural unity. A world system is thus spat ial/l emporal, cutt ing across
political and cultural units and creating an integrated zone of activity
with institutions that obey certain system ic rules. The m odern world
system has origins in European expansion beginning in the sixteenth
century. It is not bound by a unitary political structure, although after
World War II, dem ocracy becam e the desirable political regime. Its
unifying factor is not a political regime or culture, but the division of
labor resulting from the relentless pursuit of gain.*1- The accum ulation
of capital, which splits the system along a core and different degrees of
periphery, determ ines the nature of this division.11
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the political history of
the modern world system became the subject of a debate about the line
dividing the included from the excluded, as well as about the tenor, extent
and limits of tolerance. This debate occurred “within the framework of
a geo-culture that proclaimed the inclusion of all as the definition of the
good society.”" This geoculture was liberalism, which proved to be a for
midable ideological force acquiring a solid hegemony in Europe around
1848. Not only did it establish the juridical and institutional foundations to
be emulated by most countries in the world, but it was also elastic enough
to absorb anti-systemic movements arising within it. Within nation-states,
attem pts by groups to achieve inclusion as full citizens were the central
11 Torni used l>y Fernand Braudel.
" S e e Karl Polanyi, The Grrat Trmtsjbnnalioii (Boston: Beacon P ress, B i l l ), pp. PUT,
The core, Ilie “com fort zone," does no! necessarily have to coincide wil h nations or slates, bul with
I he dom inant secto rs of Iheproduelion process cut tint* across them. However, since monopolies
need the patronage of strong states, tla-re is a geographical conset]uence of the core periphery
relationship. It is also the case that Hie sam e country or nation may present a mix of eon- and
peripheral conditions. Usually, core products and services are monopolies or quasi monopolies,
white peripheral products and services are t tally “compel it ive,"l hat is, abundant and diverse. Thus,
when there is exchange for core products tout services felt as critical and crucial for the advance
ment o ft he well-being of populations, ;m unequal or asym m etrical situation develops.

focus of radical movements. First came industrial workers, who once or
ganized in unions and syndicates sought political power. After decades of
struggle, a compromise emerged: the welfare state. Then, beginning in the
1960s, those excluded from full participation and decision making—certain
racial/etlmic groups, women, sexual minorities and oppressed minorities
in colonies—voiced their anti-systemic claims. All these movements were
more or less successful in achieving full citizenship and/or independence,
but failed fully to redress systemic dynamics of exclusion.
The 1960s m arked the end of the supremacy of liberalism, thereby
dislocating the geoculture that had kept the political institutions intact.15
Decolonization, women’s movements, youth culture and labor, vindica
tion of difference and m inorities, concern for the environm ent—these
have unhinged the underpinnings of the capitalist world economy and
exposed it to the full force of political and cultural shocks from which
it had been sheltered."1During the same time, fundam entalist trends
gained ascendancy again in different places in the world.17 Cultural
transform ations soon led to new self-esteem and political dem ands,
which in tu rn put new p ressures on the system through the expansion
of linear trends. The result is th at in the last fifty years there has been a
growing squeeze on the average rate of profits; costs of production has
been rising while the m argin of surplus is narrowing. Capitalist produc
tion had to face rising labor costs, increasing costs for infrastructure
and raw m aterials and taxation.
C apitalist endeavors always attem pt to m aintain oligopolistic condi
tions. For example, the present neoliberal phase in Latin America was
enacted by dispossessing the “enclosing the commons."1” The “Washington
C onsensus” gave new im petus to institutions such as the International

►
•
>

*

i:’This corresponds to what Eric Ilobslmwm calls t lie end or the “golden age.” See Eric Ilobsbawm,
The Aye of Extremes: a Ilis to rg o f the World, 191H199I (New York: Vintage Hooks, 199-1).
lh Set* W allerstein, op. rit. (note 9), p. 77; Ilobsbawm , ibid., p. 9-19.
17 la th e ease of Islamic fundamentalism, the 19(57 Israeli-Arab war signals a turning point. See Bassam Tibi, “The Worldview of Sunni Arab Fundamentalism: Attitudes toward Modern Science and
Technology,” in Mart in Marly and Scott Appelby (ods), Fnndamen /alisms mid!Variety: Reclaiming
the Sciences, the Family and Ed neat ion (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 81.
lHA M arxist notion developed by David Harvey to re fe rto lh e reversal of common property rights
and the com m odification of cultural form s, histories, intellectual creativity, the environm ent,
genetic inform ation, public w orks, health and education. Capitalism resolved its cyclical crisis
by expanding its secu lar trends; but in the new era of globalization the possibility of overflowing
tow ards an “other" (land, population, and m arket) decreases. David Harvey, The New Im p eria l
i s m (Oxford: Oxford University P ress, 2008), pp, 137fl\
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M onetary Fund, World Trade Organization and the World Economic
Form. These in turn pushed i'or a type of globalization which opened
up all frontiers to the free flow of goods and capital, but not of people
and/or labor.1" In the midst of this, 9/11 served to legitimate the more
conservative sect ors within some core states by giving them new political
clout. These events weakened links with the more m oderate center and
thus undid cultural and social transform ations dating from the 1960s.
Most dramatically, neoliberalism was replaced by neoconservatism —a
religiously sanctioned force that culturally and politically is at w ar with
the freedom s and social advancem ents of the previous four decades.-"
Far from bringing order and restoring equilibrium to the system,
these reactions have accelerated the cycle of crisis, leading to a general
global state of war. The secular trends are moving tow ard blocking the
unrestrained continuation of an endless accum ulation of capital, the
engine of capitalist development. On the horizon are indications of great
social turmoil, in response to 1) the very fluctuations of the system itself;
2) the declining legit imacy of state structures; and :J) the cultural crisis
of prevailing symbolic system s. As Eric Hobsbawm asserts, “The world
of the third millennium will [...] alm ost certainly continue to be one of
violent politics and violent political changes. The only thing uncertain
about them is where they will lead.”-1
What will dom inate in the upcoming arrangement? Should we speak
of a system or multi system s? What values will be param ount? One
thing is certain: the present world system, ideologically dominated by
a center-liberal outlook, has now achieved its full maturity. It will do
anything possible to ameliorate the crisis, even adopting conservative
discourse(s) to suit the demands of electorates, who are determ ined to
behave in custom ary ways in the pursuit, of short-term benefits. Precisely
because the fluctuations and uncertainties are becoming more acute, the
demand for security will be stronger—and so, too, the violence.2- “States

l!lSoo N dslor Garcia CamTini, La i/lobnlizarion iatayhiaila (Buenos Aires: Paidds, 1!)!><)); Zy(>niunt Bauman, La tjlobalizaciou: cottsecucueius htnn aiias (Buenos Aims: KOK, 1999).
Sot* Harvey, op. rit. (note 18), |>. 184.
21 Hobsbawm, op. rit. (nolo 15), p. |(>().
““ Michael I la nil and Antonio Negri link this form of security to t ho contem porary stratogiosof biopowor: “Security requires rather actively and constantly shaping the environment, through military
and/or police activity. Only an active shaped world is a secure world. This not ion of security is a form
of biopower, then, in the sense that it is charged with the task of producing and transforming social
life . . . In Michael Ilardt and Antonio Negri, Multitude. (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), p. 20.

of exception” are erected as paradigms for political rule, where all citizens
are placed under perm anent suspicion and surveillance (the “Patriot Act”
in the US is an example). Moreover, as stated in the (in)famous ideologi
cal blueprint of the Bush adm inistration, Project for the New American
Century,-' m ilitary strength and control of foreign territories become
necessary steps in the larger project of spreading “appropriate” codes of
conduct lo the rest of the world.-1This violence exercised in the pursuit of
“security”—doubtful ends combined with immoral m eans—has received
strong popular backing and ideological support from a growing social and
cultural force—evangelical fundamentalism, the backbone of neoconser
vative hegemonic military power. In this fashion, liberty is curtailed in
the name of security, which in turn exacerbates inequality.
Fundam entalism prom ises a safer and more fulfilling world by sub
m itting to new heteronom ous codes and arrangem ents. R ather than
through a direct attack on the economic and political basis of empire,
this occurs indirectly by questioning the cultural and moral dynam ics of
empire: reject ing the priority of universal rights and civil law, refusing
gender equality, dism issing the separation of religion and government
and a general rebuff of dem ocratic values. Neoconservatives in the US
receive the backing of C hristian evangelical fundam entalists who are
thoroughly supportive of the system, while Islam ic fundam entalists
are anti-systemic. But both C hristian fundam entalist system support
ing neoconservatism and Islamic anti-system ic fundam entalism have a
common pattern: they either lower tolerance or openly practice intoler
ance, threatening the very nature of democracy. Both have an inbuilt
tendency toward intolerance and the negation of the other.

From plurality towards a postmodern unum
Different strands of fundamentalism are commonly marked by militancy,
exclusivism, a “fight against the world” attitude and a profound distaste for
(philosophical) relativism and (ideological) pluralism. Setting boundaries,

":J The P roject for the New Am erican Century (PNAO) is an Am erican neoconservative think
tank, based in W ashington, D C., col'ounded as “a non-profit educational organization” by Wil
liam Kristol and Robert Kagan in early 1997.
21 See Harvey, op. cif. (note 18), pp. 181 f.
"r>See Walter Mead, “God’s Country,” in Foreign A ffairs 85/5 (Sept.-Oct. 200(5), pp. 21-13.
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identifying enemies, proselytizing, creating and strengthening intermedi
ate institutions are common strategies. Common moral positions include
patriarchal models of family and opposition to abortion and same sex rela
tionships. Although counter-modern or anti-secularization attitudes seem
to galvanize their focus, most evangelicals, for instance, are not opposed to
capitalism, bureaucratic organization, mass communication technologies,
or higher education. They are not simply antimodern, but rather critical
of those aspects of modernity that they perceive to be threatening to their
core beliefs, social organizat ion and ideology, such as cultural developments
leading to a pluralization of consciousness and views.-11
As a strategy facing pluralization and secularity, fundamentalisms
share a highly cognitive doctrinal religiosity marked by an objectivistic,
dogmatic, legalistic and dissonant style. The claim to “objectivity” revamps
a hermeneutical circle, unaffected by human experience, interest s and loca
tion. In a sense, they simply continue the “epistemological objectivism” of
the West, as if reality were composed of foundational blocks of a certain
order. To uphold “the t ruth” means to respect this st ructure and order. As
the anthropologist Anthony Wallace assorts, there is a predisposition to
be infatuated with a worldview that promises order, for this is perceived
as diminishing stress. It is associated with every satisfaction derived from
life and with the maintenance and reproduction of life itself.-TConsequently,
any element that produces disturbances in this worldview automatically
implies a disturbance' in the rules of behavior. The cognitive and the moral
are, at this point, indistinguishable. Multiple cultural choices become a
terrain in order to simplify reality according to a divine norm.
Yet (late) m odernity has brought to the fore the complexity of reality,
which requires multiple metaphors and views.-”5Any monolithic conceptual
Cf. Peter Berger, Una (lloria Irjaaa: In bdsquada </r In Jr rn rjtnra tie incrcdnlid ad ( Bar
(•(‘Iona: Herder, 10!) 1), |>- 03.
J' See Anthony Wallace, R evita liz a tio n s a n d Mazeways: Essays on ('ultnre Change, vol. 1
(Lincoln: University of N ebraska Press, 2003), p. 182.
Js C'f. George Lakoffnnd Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the I'lrsh: The Embodied Mind and ils
Challenye to Western Thought (New York: Basic Hooks, 1000), p. 78. Integrism as fundamentalism
expresses thus a cognitive strategy which tries to homogenize what is radically plural. Against this
background they can be considered as a form of super-st it ion (super stare), to the extent that they
intend to recreate concept ions of nature, society, culture and self which are thought or imagined as
having once wide currency, Although to a certain extent t hey share many of t he traces of religious
revitalization movements (Wallace), that is, the deliberate, organized and conscious effort to construct
a more satisfying cult tire and social environment, they are epistemologically unable to produce what
these movements successfully do: a widespread reduction and/or redirection of stress. Therefore it
would he more adequate to consider fundamentalisms as truncated revitalization movements, for
they are constantly tempted to idealize a past in face oft he perils of the present.
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system soon proves to be inconsistent, unable to establish congruence
with diverse m etaphors and symbols. In the end, fundam entalism s are
not only incapable of surm ounting dissonance, but they become spaw n
ing terrain for new ones. This generates additional cognitive dissonance
which at best may be able to offer a “solution” for individuals within
empire, but not to the injustices brought by it.
In sum, different fundamentalism s appear to share a common, coun
tercultural strategy that, is linked to the social, cultural and economic
conditions set in mot ion by globalization and late modernity. Facing this
dislocation, they aim to influence societies and cultures by encouraging
stances to secure or avoid uncertainty, sanction power distance, stress
the collective rather than the individual and give prominence to the m as
culine rather than the feminine.-' In these strategies, m atters pertaining
t,o sexuality, family and above all, the role of women stand out. "1These
issues not only enforce patriarchal property rights and the male monopoly
of the labor market, but also communal reproduction where women are
perceived to be the m ost reliable agents in the transm ission of culture and
religion. Because modern economic pressures invariably change family
patterns and gender roles, “womb” and “school” appear as the inst itutional
battlefronts of fundam entalist reaction. “Womb” signifies the power to
control reproduction and perpetuate the patriarchal model of family;
‘school” represents the entrance gate into the public sphere.

Tolerance as a critical and democratic tool
Because of cognitive, social and cultural uncertainties, fundam ental
isms (direct ly or indirectly) support political regimes that curb tolerant
2!' C f Geert Hofstede, Cultures and Organ izations: SuJ'tu'are o f the M ind (New York: McGrawHill, 1D97), pp. l-irr.
:i0 See Michael Walzer, On Toleration (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1997), pp.
(ill'f. In the ease of Homan Catholic integrism , th is cognitive objectivism , d ista ste for pluralism
and legalistic outlook is illustrated by its m ilitant opposition to issues ranging from the in tro 
duction of sexual education in schools and the distribution of condom s in sta te hospitals, to
gay rights (civil union) and the decrim inalization of abortion. The w ar m etaphor acquires new
currency, as denoted by th e statem ents of inlegrist ideologues when referring to feminism, one
of the disturbing “dissonances" in late m odernity. According to Adolfo C astaneda, d irecto r of
Vida H u m a n a Jnteruacioual and a consultant Cor the inlegrist circles in Latin America, we are
facing a ‘'cultural subversion,” w h ere" ‘gender perspectives’ represent one of the most dangerous
ideological weapons m ustered to destroy life and family, and therefore, society.” That such views
exist in the pluralistic setting of late m odernity must not alarm us; w hat is cause for alarm is
their active pursuit of political m eans to enforce their vision of a CatoHcisma int<\<jral.
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practices and dem ocratic demands. Often this takes the form of an open
protest against globalization and its discontents, thus coinciding with other
forms of protest stemming from the left. “ But these strategies for change
seeks to reinforce rigid cultural and institutional values. They severely
question not only the shortcom ings of actual dem ocracies under empire,
but also the core values th at inform and sustain dem ocratic practices
in its many forms. When globalization, dem ocracy and secularization
are lumped together as a threat, when pluralism and epistemological
uncertainties are seen as uniformly eroding the very fabric of human
society, then violence and intolerance appear as suitable weapons in an
already violent and increasingly intolerant environment.
In effect, uncertainty, pluralism, relativity, radical difference, liquid
boundaries, diffuse hierarchy, soft epistemology—i.e., cultural charac
teristics of late m odernity—represent for fundam entalism a dreadful
and demonic horizon th at m ust be avoided and fought against at all
costs. While these factors appear to be easier to digest for some, fun
dam entalist movements—especially Islamic and evangelicals outside
the US—seem to provide a consoling response to those who lose out
or are subordinated, excluded and/or threatened by global cultural and
economic tren d s.12When differences of culture, ethnicity and religion
coincide with class and/or geopolitical subordination, the terrain ap
pears particularly fertile for fundamentalism. This monumental systemic
challenge calls for new understandings of democracy and tolerance and
red ress of economic and social inequalities.
We cannot forget, as Ilardt and Negri have noted, that these reactions
are symptoms signaling a passage to a new social, pol itical and economic
arrangem ent. The tragedy is that fundam entalism purports to be a cure,
encouraging its supporters to pursue strategies th at curb dem ocratic
practices. Plurality, diversity and tolerance are seen as contributing to
m aterialism , consum erism and the West’s cultural “decadence.”
Is it possible to separate the waning forces of empire from the val
ues associated w ith dem ocratic practices? Is “dem ocracy” indissolubly
tied to the cultural and political history of the West? Can the value and

21 <’f . Ilardt ami Negri, oj>. HI. (note 22), pp. 235f.
12 Cf. William II. McNeill, "Fundam entalism s and the World of tile 1990s,” in Marty and Appelby,
op. ril. (note 17), pp. MBIT. One problem ofliis account is that, lie does not pay enough attention
to the system ic dim ension of fundam entalism , and the class com ponent of it. Rather, lie sees it
mostly as a strategy that m inim izes friction in the transition from rural t.o urban life.
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practice oflolerance be proven to be an equally effective way to redress
social, cultural and economic grievances?
Tolerance has been defined in many ways depending on the social, politi
cal and cultural valuations of diversity, otherness and difference. It is not
an absolute reality, but signifies different points on a continuum, different
possibilit ies and st rategies that move from more passive to more proactive
underst andings. " For example, when a moral good such as peace is set as a
socially desirable goal, then tolerance may come as a resigned acceptance
of difference for the sake of that ultim ate goal. Tolerance is therefore in
strum ental in the pursuit of another moral good. This attitude may come
very close to one where tolerance results from its lack of moral weight, as
when a relaxed benignity stems from sheer indifference towards differences.
A third possibility poses tolerance as the appropriate attitude that must
follow the recognition that others have the same universal rights as we do,
similar to stoic and Kantian philosophy. Tolerance, thus, is associated with
the realization of universal sam eness,11and becomes something that must
be endured, ignored or made dependent upon a homogenizing identity.
Two other attitudes regarding tolerance are possible as proactive
responses to the challenging globalized scenario. Here difference and
plurality acquire a moral quality of their own, and the idea of tolerance
m utates from negative or condescending forbearance to active love. The
first is an attitude of curiosity toward the other that leads to respect and
the willingness to learn. Here tolerance is subsumed under an openness
towards that which is different, and assumes that our own stories, tradit ions
and being are by themselves incomplete. The second embraces tolerance
as sheer and unwavering acceptance of the other, as an expression of the
largeness and diversity of human nature in God’s evolving plan.
From certain points of view, this second attitude constitutes the
ideal to which hum anity is called—a veritable state of grace and love.
But in a pluralistic and globalized world, this is likely to be limited to
small num bers who are inspired by mythic narratives. It is impossible
:l'ln wluit Follows I pursin' Walzor's suggest inns, although with certain modifications. See Walzer,
op, ril. (note :J0), pp. lOff.
:u History shows different political arrangem ents to cope with difference and o th ern ess—mul
tinational em pires, millet system , consocialcs nations, nation-states, im m igrant societies, etc.
But in these regim es, tolerance has always been an instrum ental and external achievem ent,
som ething n ecessary in order to enforce other ends and goods—the rule by the few, peace as
controlled violence, assim ilation, econom ic exploitation, etc. Yet, the fragility of these regim es
o flo leran ce was the latent or overt intolerant principle inbuilt w ithin them, an intolerance that
precisely made of “tolerance" a necessity of instrum ental value.
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for tolerance to have the same subjective m eaning for all participants
in society. Moreover, a psychologically normal and sane society is one
in which habitually people strongly disagree; general and homogeneous
agreement is rare outside the sphere of instinctive human qualities.:1, But
the main objection against unqualified acceptance is that it does not leave
much room for a critical appraisal of the other that can squarely face the
constant conflict of values and interests that m arks human reality.
A Lutheran anthropology has taught us to be critical of utopianism that
purports to uphold lofty ideals without recognizing the conflict with other
values, interests and concerns. Life always presses difficult choices t o be
made in the larger and often conflictual arena of polit ical life. Therefore
tolerance, as a moral practice, can be said to occur properly when we
are open to communicate and interact with people whose beliefs we do
not necessarily adopt and whose practices we do not im itate—when we
coexist with an otherness that rem ains different, alien and strange. This
is tolerance as critical openness, recognizing our ongoing incompleteness
and relative truth. Yet it is also a critical openness since it attem pts to bal
ance the moral weight of otherness with other values—such as freedom,
peace, equality and integrity. It entails not only recognizing that, the other,
with their truth, will perhaps never come closer to ours, or vice versa, but
also that in exercising our choices as moral beings we will often collide
with other choices, interests and values.
Openness, a pluralistic epistemology and a critical acceptance of
the other, delineate a sound psychological, affective and cognitive ap 
proach for practicing tolerance today. But critical openness requires
th at tolerance m ust not restrict itself to behaviors and attitudes. It must
express itself in an institutional and political form. Otherwise, tolerance
may only breed its own demise. Values and moral goods, encoded in the
symbolic language of religious (or secular) narrat ives, m ust be made
effective in social and political arrangem ents.

Narratives and theological construal:
Steps towards a public Lutheran theology
Tolerance, therefore, is a multileveled compound of cognitive, social,
institutional and psychological factors. But three dim ensions must be
See Carl Jung (oil.), Man a n d h i s Symbols (Now York: Doll Publishing, Il)7f>), |). -1(1.
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addressed for (lie sake of a tolerant, and dem ocratic culture and social
arrangem ent:
•

As the Dutch anthropologist, G eert Hofstede, has shown, power,
distance and tolerance are key dim ensions structuring any society
and culture through dynam ics acquired in the family, school and
w orkplace.!" We cannot ignore the psychological and sym bolic
ground (hat n urtures certain views of tolerance. Background theo
ries, social experiences, religious symbols and m ythical narratives
set the param eters for an axiological universe (m ythical-ethical
core) where tolerance and respect are param ount . Here the them e
of justification is key for an attitude of inclusion in the face of the
exclusion generated by fundam entalism and empire.

•

In oi'dcr for this to flourish, a receptive environment is necessary. A
democratic horizon and regime are needed to sustain a new biopoliti
cal network. While the patterns of genuine democracy are created in
the collaborat ive and respectful cooperative practices from below,
overarching institutional guarantees are also necessary. Building up
a cit izenship of service is the fundamental bulwark against empire’s
subtleties and fundam entalist militancy. The theme of the cross
provides a crucial key for a political direction and social critique.

•

Finally, the grievances and sufferings that may breed intolerant reac
tions must be redressed. Speaking about tolerance, therefore, implies
a new world system where the services and resources involved in
reproducing and expanding life are more or less equally shared and
fairly exchanged. In other words, tolerance calls for new cooperative
and communicative networks of labor and production. Empire in its
present form must be destroyed but without falling into the funda
mentalist temptation. Theologically, this involves a convergence of the
cross as a critique of the empire and power, justification as a declara
tion of inclusiveness and the multilayered action of God in creation to
provide clear direction for responsible citizenship in the world.

The first level refers to the psychological and epistemological openness
that is com m unicated through m ythical narratives and/or hermeneu:',d

See Ilofstt'<lt\ op. cif. (note 29), pp. 23IT,
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tics—either sacred or secular. Here the psychological lives of individuals
and communities are formed. Thoughts, feelings, intention and adaptive
practices are drawn from the range of belief systems in a given culture.
In late modernity, religious symbols, narratives and myths are acquiring
renewed vitality and interest. This places theology and ethics in a new light,
for values never appear in a vacuum, independent from narratives.
We know w hat the human is by telling a story. A story interweaves
the challenges and value conflicts that are a part of the human condit ion.
Most of these stories have deeply religious roots—either because they
refer to a reality th at lies beyond the obvious one, or because they appear
as eruptions or gifts coming from an unconscious and transcendental
level. These stories are effective to the extent that the prim ary caretakers
not only socialize the young in this atm osphere, but are also com m itted
to realizing the values and prospects grafted into the myth.
Theological reflection here offers critical clues for interpreting these
myths and symbols, thereby enhancing their formative powers. Notions
regarding the nature of the divine, time, space, will, body, mind, animals,
plants, land and the human condition, directly affect the way people situate
themselves in face of otherness, plurality and difference. Thus one of the
foremost challenges is to qualify and/or deconstruct theistic God symbols
inherited from the Axial Age (800 BCE-200 BCE), allowing instead for a
vision of transcendence that, can accommodat e the integrity and difference
of other beliefs and conceptions of the sacred.17Again, it is not a matter
of simple and uncritical acceptance, a sort of “postmodern” embrace of
everything in order to hold nothing. Instead, a critical openness is possible
because of the non-exclusivist clues provided by the specific convictions
of one’s mythical symbolization. Values pointing toward openness and tol
erance can and must be found within the integrity of one’s own narrative.
This theological endeavor will be measured by its ability to reconstruct
a language of freedom, equality and tolerance after deconstructing t exts
that once served to legitimate oppressive dominion.
The doctrine of justification by faith, Paul’s interpretation of Jesu s’
gospel as it reaches people in the m argins (Cf. 1 Cor 1:26-29), is a
key component in the Lutheran mythical narrative. The doctrine, as
formulated by Paul and afterw ards, is a critical and central guide to
understanding the biblical message regarding the relationships between

(if. Mark Heim, The Depth o f Rietn-s: A T r i n ita r ia n Tlteolo</f/ o f Itetigious [Axis ((Jrand
Rapids: Kcrdmans, 2001), pp. Of.
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hum ans, creation and God. It radically redraw s the boundaries of God’s
dom ain in order to include those who hitherto were considered far from
it: gentiles, slaves, women, urban poor, artisan s and people of doubtful
religious orthodoxy. This inclusiveness is basic to all other doctrines
and statem ents regarding C hristian life. It leads to a gracious appraisal
of the life of every person and creature.
In the sam e vein, Luther employed the language of justification to
indicate what God has done for all through Christ: m aking 11s equal
participants in the justice revealed in Jesus. In this case, “sinners” were
included, which in the medieval scholastic practice of distinguishing
between clergy and Uiity m eant practically all of those who lived in the
saeculum . Luther could forcefully stress justification because this was
central to a radical reconception of God and God’s intim ate involvement
with creation in general and sinners in particular. Luther’s formulation of
the theology of the cross, which stands at the center of his understand
ing of the Trinity, is what gives such pow er to the notion of justifica
tion in relation to the graciousness of life. In both cases, the language
of justification expresses a strategy of inclusion of the destitute, the
m arginal and the excluded, not into the logic of what exists, but into a
new redistributive com m unity of social, spiritual and m aterial goods.’1"
This com m unicated the hidden ch aracter of God’s rule, and subverted
the retributive traditions where God is powerfully present in the world
and to whom all creatures m ust submit.
In their respective ways, both Paul and Luther sought to translate into
their contexts the normative dimension of Jesus’ message about a merciful
Father and a generous kingdom, as well as his m inistry of trespassing the
multiple frontiers that put human beings in an interdict, thereby robbing
God of God’s glory. In effect, justification encodes the multiple forms in
which Jesus’ministry interweaves divine righteousness, social justice and
mercy, clashing with Roman commercialization, Herodian urbanization,
priestly codification and imperial monetization. Ilis wandering among
the ptochoi with the empowering message of the kingdom reveals the
different dislocations that the empire exploited for its own benefit. The
existence of so many who were excluded indicated the inherent limits
and cruelty of the “honor” and social net constituted by the overlapping
of pyramidal schemes of patronage proper to the Augustan era.
18 Sep th is concept developed in M artin Luther, “Sermon on the M essed Sacram ent ol tlie Holy
and True Body of Christ and the B rotherhoods" (1519), in Helmut T. Lehm annn (ed.), Luther's
Works, vol. 35 (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1900), pp. 45 ff.

Jesu s’ proclam ation of a kingdom for the nobodies and undesirables
touched on the m ost pressing issues of the time: debt, bread, sham e and
impurity. Exorcisms and the healing of bodies and spirit s broke the spell
th at bound and burdened colonial and undesirable people. When Jesus
broke bread, he adopted the degraded position of women: he served, he
was the hostess. With this practice, he w itnessed to the righteousness
God willed for creation, and communicated an egalit arian and unbrokered
sharing of God’s goodness and mercy. In the sam e vein, Jesus’ crossing
of different frontiers allowed individuals and groups into an im mediate
physical and spiritual contact with God’s justice, and thus unm ediated
physical and spiritual contact with one another. As the gospel traditions
emphasize, Jesus crossed the traditional boundaries of family, honor and
dishonor, Jews and Gentiles, men and women, sick and healt hy, pure and
impure, ru ral and urban, poor and rich. Bearing w itness t o the F ather’s
mercy and coming reign, Jesus em bodies a new space: the space of the
Spirit. Ilis body, his presence, becomes the locus for a new narrative
th at is not only about God, but also about how God crosses over into
the bodies and minds of those who never expected to be considered as
somebodies. To draw front iers is an act of disenfranchising power; to
tresp ass is an act of divine im agination and love.111
The plots of Jesu s’ parables have either a good or a tragic ending. Re
versals are a st andard feature. In its tragic mode, this reversal signifies
an exclusion of those who think that inclusion is their lot due to their
righteousness. In the hum orous plot, those m arginalized and outcast,
who had never expected to be invited, paid in full, welcomed home, or
rescued, are surprised by their sudden good fortune. Jesus’ parables
com prise a skillful social and cultural com m entary on insiders and
outsiders, subverting the code that establishes the boundaries of God’s
com panionship.1" Outsiders were synonymous with “sinners”, that is,
lepers, the maimed, the blind, gentiles, Sam aritans, petty tax officials,
single women, destitute fishermen and misfits of every sort.
Luther him self points in this direction as he relates the reality of
justification to the parable of the Good Sam aritan (Lk 10:29-137). In this
story, with its vivid bodily references, Luther saw the nature of God’s
saving activity in Christ portrayed as a God who becomes our neighbor,
111See Guillermo Hansen, “On Boundaries anti Bridges: Lutheran C om m unioand Catholicity,” in
Wolfgang Greivo (o<L), Between Vision a nd Reality: Let heron Churches inn Transition. LWF
Documen tation -'47/2001 (Genova: The Lutheran World Federation, 2001), pp. 87l\
10 See Robert Funk, Honest to Jesus (San F rancisco: IlarporS anF rancisco, 1000), p. 102.
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a God who crosses frontiers. The wounded man is reborn through the
gracious help of the Sam aritan (Christ). The wounded man represents
hum anity under the curse of the law. To be justified and to be healed
are practically synonymous. Luther comments th at the C hristian “has
begun to be justified and healed (s a m n i), like the man who was half
dead (son inivus)."" In the end, what this parable tells us is th at in God’s
domain, help or salvation comes only to those who have no reason to
expect it, and who cannot resist it when it is offered.112 It is an act. of
sheer, unexpected, gracious inclusiveness. From the point of view of
what Luther called an existence cursed by the law, salvation comes from
that quarter from which one does not and cannot, expect it.
In brief, intrinsic to the concept of justification is this tension b e
tween in - and outsiders, identity and universality, staying and crossing,
local and global, particular and universal. For those who have been
t ouched by God’s mercy, just ification implies not only to be present at
the many boundaries that divide humanity, but also to discern which
ones need to be crossed, which ones need to be dism antled and which
one’s need simply to be named and made visible. The gospel narratives
about “crossing over” are a vindication of bodies that have been broken
by debt, tort lire, enclosures, despair and abandonm ent—by the curse of
the law. This is the particular sensitivit y associated with God’s crossing
movement s, in which C hristians participate in and out of the sam e love
that once crossed over to them. This is why nobody is really an insider:
to live by grace is the recognition that , to different, degrees, we are all
p art of a koinon in of outsiders.
As any doctrine, the principle of justification is a regulative principle
embedded in a cultural-linguistic grid that encourages certain attitudes,
behaviors and relationships.1:1Reversal, inclusion, new circuits of power
and affirmation, an assertion of the different, that, does not fit under
the law, sensitivity tow ards the impure and sham ed—these constitute
basic attitudinal com ponents encoded under justification by faith. To
discern these is a sort of alchemy. It is an urgent, task because enipha11.laroslavIVIiknn (n].),Liillm’'a Works, vol. 27 (Knint Louis: Concordia Publishing llouso, lilfi-1), p.227;
\VA 11:10”). Luther shows a continuity of this image as we can see in writings from 1510 through 1510.
12 Ibid., p. ISO.
Following Robert .Jenson, we can say that the doctrine of justification functions as a •‘m eta
linguistic" device to regulate that every speech on God and salvation must proceed in such a
m anner that salvation is understood not as a badge, a medal or a price, hut as the gift and p re s
ence of the Holy Spirit in the person of the Son.
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sizing an absolute Law or an absolute One has served as the foundation
for sovereignty and dominion, forcing heterogeneous multitude's into a
suffocating uninn: One God, one People, One Leader.11This level is I bus
a key in the conform ation of a spiritual and psychological openness to
otherness th at would he the basis for any challenge to hegemonic and
intolerant views. Yet to create this climate, other variables must come
into play, that is, key grievances must, he institutionally and socially
addressed—as mentioned below.
The virtue of tolerance requires not only particular religious and
moral sensitivities (as derived from justification), hut also a political
regime or arrangem ent that guarantees minimal conditions, precisely
because of the crisis generated by diversity. Moral and religious sensitivi
ties are neither independent of certain narratives nor uncoupled from
the political realm. This is the second level referred to above, winch
points to dem ocracy as both a cultural horizon for the expression of
the multitude, as well as a political and institutional arrangem ent that
locates sovereignty in the hands of the people.
After the Cold War, the concept of democracy has been set adrift from
its rigid moorings, thus providing new opportunities for its reconception.
In effect, the forces of globalization have posed formidable challenges,
and there are strong differences regarding the compatibility and future
of democracy in late modernity. Social democratic argum ents claim that
dem ocracy is debilitated or threatened by globalization, especially by
its economic forces and fundam entalist reactions. The reassertion of
the sovereignty of nation-states, therefore, seem s the best strategy in
the present global system. Liberal cosm opolitan argum ents stress that
the forces of globalization, while not always beneficial at first, release

11 CJ. lliinll and Nojtri, <>I'■<H. (note 22), p. 221).
1' Or course, we a ir not only socialized through religious narratives. Seliool fsi ale) and I lolly wood
also possess an incredible formative power. Religious views are constantly intertw ined with other
narratives, "background theories” and experiences, which in turn slowly modify, or manipulate, the
prospective tolerant-dimensions found in religious stories. These contextual aspects can never be
dismissed; plurali/ed scenarios already constitute a powerful enticement for reviewing any sort
of exdusivism and intolerance. Hut while for some this is a blessing in disguise since it catalyzes
values and behaviors seen as central to one’s own religious outlook—as can be freedom, integrity,
self-esteem, choice, diversity—for others, this same scenario is simply harrowing, cognitively and
psychologically impossible to bear, I bus encouraging an epic account that places the stressful con
science in the path of either a militant, apocalyptic or messianic release. In this fashion, intolerant
attitudes are one of the possibilities that a confusing and pluralized semiotic context may elicit,
seeking a.sort of totalitarian order that prom ises to reduce stress by negating differences.
Sec Hardt and Neri, op. vit. (note 22), p. 222.
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the dem ocratic potential of people precisely by prom oting freedom
from the rule of nation-slates. Neoconservative ideologues stress that
only intervention by the coalition of the willing—led by the US—can
foster dem ocratic forces and institutions. Traditionalists, on the other
hand, contest both the leading role of the US and the com patibility of
democracy with the cultural values of non-W esterners.17
None of these views, however, seem s sufficient for confronting t he
new dem ands for tolerance, justice, peace and democracy. Democracy
is confronted with a leap of scale, where the local appears more inten
sively related to the global, superseding the boundaries of traditional
nation-states. The present grievances against political, ecological and
economic aspects, including the current state of war, are sym ptoms of a
crisis within the present world syst em and a rebellion against the formal
m echanism s of sovereignty and its failing system of representational
decision-making processes.
Lutheranism came only rather late to valuing dem ocracy positively.
Lut her was certainly no democrat , and neither were m ost Lut herans—es
pecially in Germany—until well into the second half of the tw entieth
century.IS But this anti-dem ocratic stance has more to do with a p atri
archal and hierarchical sociopolitical ideology than with the m essage
of justification and the cross. Not only theologies of glory, but also ide
ologies of glory need to be crit icized; cross and justification also entail
a gospel which transversely impinges upon power and authority. This
is precisely what a theology of the cross does. It should not be limited,
as in classical Lutheranism, to an anthropological and soteriological
dimension, but it is also a sociopolitical event that reveals, or m akes
visible, the use and abuse of power by empire. Jesus’ cross was not an
event m arginal to the empire. But neither is only its underside—as in
Gustavo Gutierrez’ sense. Rather, it expresses its very core, the center
of empire itself, the manifest ation of its raw power, of its m ercilessness,
it s debauchery and its arrogance.
Imperial sovereignty does not exist without t he negation of an “other”
who refuses to be a willing participant in the spoils of exploitative m a
chinery. The cross is a profound “No” to the “Yes” with which we tend to
ordinary life. It is a verdict denouncing som ething th at is fundam entally

17 Sec Ibid., pp.
|rl Sec .John Shimmc. "Luloro no ora dom ocnila,” in Sovoiino C rnallo cl »/., Dcmocrttcin: min
(‘nnnjrlirn (Buonos A in's: La Aurora, 108:}), pp, 10-85.
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wrong with how the world is stru ctu re d .1'1In other words, Golgotha is
the m irror image of the A m P a d s Auguslae, the distorted reflection of
the Octavian imperial realized eschatology, the unm asking of Rome as
the benefactor of all humanity. '" The cross signals t he end of empire in
a dual sense: as the end of its hidden goal, violence, as well as the end
of its legitimacy through God’s reversal of values in which God .justifies
the victim of the public, legal and official imperial power—Jesus. '1
This understanding of the cross is what distinguishes as well as
galvanizes the dialectic of law and gospel. This cross, in turn, is the
key for a contem porary Lutheran appropriation of the doctrine of the
Trinity and the theory of God’s m ultidimensional action in creat ion (the
so-called doctrine of the two kingdoms). In this vein, the very dynamic of
the T rinitarian concept of God and the t wofold or multiple ruling of the
Triune God encourages a public and political theology firmly anchored
through the cross in the world of the victims. Its thorough deconstruc
tion of a power that stem s from above post ulates th at another form of
power is possible, a power that is enacted by breaching frontiers and
vindicating the right of the pow erless to live. Yet, p art of the sam e
Lutheran articulation is of a cautionary tone that protects the irreduc
ible nature of the gospel from the necessary tem poral realizations that
always include a certain degree of coercion and even violence. In t his
eon we cannot live only from the m ediations furnished by the gospel,
but at the sam e time we cannot exercise a power th at is not congruent
with the drive of this sam e gospel. Far from falling into new dualisms,
this Lutheran caution is the basis for the critique not only of any form
of (fundament alist.) enthusiasm , but also of any form of imperial power
which always attem pts t o hide the violence of its law under a putative
evaugeiium of peace, “democracy,” progress, or God’s will.
The theology of the cross calls things as they really are,"" without
falling into a legalism or an utopian idealization. For this theology to
be publicly relevant, its m etaphors must be woven with kindred values
l!l <’f. .John Dominic Crossan, The Ilirlh Of ('Itrislitniili/; Discovering tehol llapprneil in
the Years Im m ed ia tely after the Execution of Jes us (San I'Yanciseo: H arperSanFranscisco,
1008), p. 258.
,u Sec Helmut Koeslcr, “.Jesus the Victim,” in Journal of Biblical Literature 111/1 (1002), pp. 8-18.
See John Dominic Crossan, “The Hesurrect ion of Jesus in its Jew ish Context,” in Neotestamentica 87/1 (2008), pp. 20-87.
’-S ee th e s is 21, Luther’s “Heidelberg Disputation" {1518), in Helmut T, Lehnuumn (ed.), Luther's
Waits, vol. 81 (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1087), p. 88.

from other traditions. The Roussonian concept of volonte generate,
M ontesquieu’s and Locke’s division of powers, Kant’s sapere aude!,
Madison’s constitutional check and balances, M arx’s concept of social
democracy, Lenin’s critique of im perialism , Foucault’s m icrophysics of
power—all coalesce in a postm odern notion of radical dem ocracy th at
grows as the living alternative of the m ultitude through the network
spaw ned by empire. This form of dem ocracy, which challenges the
m onarchial principle of empire (as in US m ilitary force), and its a ris
tocratic principle (the G-8), emerges from within the im perial logic of
late modernity. It is a new form of sovereignty based on communicat ion,
relationships and different forms of life th at nonetheless are able to find
and discover what they have in common. For that reason, dem ocratic
dem ands—although always imbued with particu lar and therefore self
ish in terests—can be seen as the m eans through which the living God
provident ially holds God’s creation in view of its final fulfillment . After
all, this form of swarm ing com m unication—and not an hierarchical
O rdnung—b etter reflects the dynam ism proper to a T rinitarian God.
This T rinitarian understanding, m ediated by Jesu s’ cross and God’s
justification, provides a positive valuation of the new realities set off
by the new dem ocratic networks. They com m unicate middle axiom s
where participation, tolerance and peace appear as central values for
political practice. Democratic participation and t olerance thus ground
the m inimal conditions for a lasting peace; a peace th at is not merely
the absence of violence and war, but. the basic precondition for reason,
imagination, desire, emotions, feelings and affections. Without tolerance,
wit hout participation, but above all, wit bout peace, no cooperation, com
munication, forms of life and social relationships can emerge from the
incredible pot ential of the swarm ing multitude. These are the “w eapons”
th at signal the dem ocratic critique of arm s, launching a critique of the
m assive m eans of destruction at disposal of the core powers, as well
as of the equally disturbing weapons of the dispossessed, namely, the
immolation of their own bodies.
As Reinhold Niebuhr once assert ed, the hum an capacity for justice
m akes of dem ocracy som ething possible; but its inclination to injustice
m akes of dem ocracy som ething n ec essary .r,:l The sam e can be said
regarding tolerance. Therefore dem ocracy should be m easured both

' 5 (7 Roinlmld Niebuhr, The (Children of Litjhl find the Children o f Darkness (New York:
Churlos Scrilm or’s Sons, 1014).
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by its capability to voice the grievances of a particular group as well
as the ability to connect different kinds of groups (economic, political,
human rights, education, ecology, health). These grievances give' rise
to a multitude through which the future of democracy is at stake. This
requires a renewed dem ocratic ethic, one which bridges ideas, hopes
and affection, allowing an emotional yet also rational identification with
a network of differentiated dem ocratic power.
With this we reach a third level as to how we redress global and local
grievances that are economic, social and ecological in nature—different
forms of intolerance that also generate intolerant reactions. If the im pe
rial world system cannot become more egalitarian, then the appeal of
fundamentalist minorities will certainly be strengthened. Grievances and
suffering bring us to the bedrock of human existence; t his is the source
of “local knowledge” that signals the inadequacies of ideological, social
and economic system s/'1Grievances, therefore, voice the “insurrection
of subjugated knowledge" against, hegemonic ideologies—which also
include the different forms of fundamentalisms.™ Of course, suffering
is never without interpretation, but our bodies make of it a mediated im
mediacy, thus enclosing a negat ive universality that challenges programs
and system s thriving on elusive prom ises and concrete duress.
Deprivation and poverty may breed anger, indignation and antagonism,
but revolt arises only on the basis of “wealt h”—a surplus of intelligence,
vision, experience, knowledge and desire that is generated by a shift,
in social practices and cultural patterns. Herein lies, precisely, the in
adequacy of the intolerant strategies and weapons of both empire and
fundam entalism s. They recoil from the m ost fundam ental “weapon” of
all, a proactive tolerance that comes with love. Without, this love, neither
just ice nor peace can perm eate the increasing webs connect ing us all on
this fragile planet. It is not t hat, fundament alist s are incapable of loving,
but that they are blind to the political dimension of love. If both the forces
th at create economic disparities, as well as many of the fundamentalist
reactions, make of violent behavior and intolerance prime weapons, (hen
violence can only grow exponentially until it destroys us all.
This is why fundam entalism is a sympt om of the disruptive forces of
an unfair globalization, but not its cure. It is one of the powerful tluctuaCf. Francis Schiisslcr Kiorenza, “The Crisis ol' Herm eneutics and C hristian Theology," in
Sheila (Iit'cvc Davaney fed.), Theology at the End of Modernity (Philadelphia: Trinity Press
International, 1991), p. P!o.
See Michael Foucault, Povver/Knowledge (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982), pp. 80f.
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tions indicating a possible bifurcation. But so are the powerful cultural
and political experiences disclosing a common bio-political desire th at
rest s on a proaet ive exercise of tolerance as an affirm ation of life in its
multiple expressions. For that to happen, the fight for dem ocracy m ust
always be tied to a relentless pursuit, of fairness and the eradication of
poverty, which can only be reached t hrough a serious reorientation of the
disparities generated by capit alism and its global division of labor. For
only when the grievances of the m ajority are duly heard and redressed
and when we are ready to look at the grim face of asym m etrical power,
will we be able to walk in the full promise and creat ive force of tolerance
and dem ocratic affirmation. And in the m idst of its humming, also be
able to discern the Triune and prom ising activity of our Triune God.

